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FOREWORD
Latin America’s expanding political, economic,
and military relationships with actors outside the
Western Hemisphere have been an important part of
the dynamics of globalization in the post-Cold War
world. For the U.S. military and U.S. political leaders,
understanding those dynamics and the challenges,
opportunities, and vulnerabilities they imply is an important part of managing U.S. security in a complex
and increasingly interdependent world.
While Chinese, Russian, and Iranian activities in
the region have received substantial scrutiny by the
U.S. security community and independent scholars,
much less attention has been given to the role of India,
and its implications. In the present monograph, Dr.
Evan Ellis of the U.S. Army War College (USAWC)
Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) makes a broad, yet
detailed, comparison of the activities of India and the
People’s Republic of China (PRC) in Latin America
and the Caribbean.
Across the broad range of sectors that he examines,
Dr. Ellis finds that Indian activities in the region are
more modest than those of the PRC, and are generally concentrated on a more limited set of countries
and sectors. Yet, in analyzing the details of those interactions, he comes to the provocative conclusion
that India has the potential to build a very positive
relationship with the region, in some areas surpassing and potentially even serving as a counterweight
to the activities of China. For U.S. policymakers, such
thinking about the interplay between multiple extrahemispheric actors in Latin America in economic and
political as well as military dimensions is part of the
multidimensional strategic thinking that is important
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to bring to bear in facing the challenges of the 21stcentury security environment.
			
			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute and
			
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
This monograph is a comparative assessment of
the activities of the governments and companies of
the Republic of India and of the People’s Republic of
China (PRC) in Latin America and the Caribbean covering a 15-year period, from the beginning of the 21st
century through 2016.
That engagement is examined with respect to the
high-level diplomacy of each of the two actors, as well
as the volume and patterns of trade, the activities of
Indian and Chinese companies in the region, and their
relationships to their respective governments in eight
sectors. These sectors are: (1) petroleum and mining;
(2) agriculture; (3) construction; (4) manufacturing
and retail; (5) banking and finance; (6) logistics and
port operations; (7) technology, such as telecommunications, space, and high technology; and, (8) military
sales and activities.
Across the areas examined, Indian engagement is
significantly less than that of the PRC, and concentrated in a more limited subset of countries and sectors.
Within selected sectors, Indian engagement generally
features a greater number of smaller actors, more independent from the state, and often more entrepreneurial. The efforts by the Indian Government to support Indian companies in the region are more modest,
and often less coordinated, than those of the PRC.
With respect to diplomatic engagement, the PRC
has generally made a broader and more concerted effort to engage with the states of Latin America and the
Caribbean than has India, including three state visits
to the region by Chinese President Xi Jinping by the
end of 2016. These featured trips to multiple countries,
as compared with a single visit to the region by India’s
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leadership—the July 2014 trip to Brazil by Prime Minister Modi in conjunction with the BRICS summit.
With respect to commerce, India’s bilateral trade
with Latin America and the Caribbean of $46.53 billion in 2014 was only about one-sixth of the PRC’s
$285.66 billion in trade with the region. Yet, the rate of
growth of India’s trade with the region is comparable
to that of the PRC, and India’s balance of trade is more
beneficial to the region.
Both Chinese and Indian companies are significant investors in Latin America’s petroleum and mining sectors. Chinese companies have generally been
larger purchasers of that sector’s products and have
an ownership share in a greater number of countries
in those sectors; yet, Indian companies are generally
positioned in higher-value-added activities.
In agriculture, although China and India are competing purchasers of Latin American foodstuffs, Indian companies have invested in niche areas such as
sugar refining. On balance, however, Chinese efforts
have surpassed those of India, with attempts to establish agro-industrial complexes and to acquire major
companies such as H.K. Noble and Nidera, with important holdings in Argentina and Brazil.
In construction, significant activities by Chinese
companies, concentrated in loan-based infrastructure
construction projects in the ALBA (Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas) countries and the Caribbean,
are in contrast to an almost complete absence of Indian firms from the sector. India’s absence is due to
a combination of Indian construction firms working
at near capacity in India itself, a lack of experience in
doing business in Latin America, and the difficulty
for Indian companies to obtain major loans to support
projects abroad from India’s development bank.
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In manufacturing and retail, both China and India
have a significant presence in the region, although
with different areas of emphasis. While a small number of Indian companies, such as Bajaj and Mahindra,
have sold products to Latin America since the 1990s,
Chinese manufacturers have moved more aggressively to establish final assembly facilities in major
markets, such as Brazil and Mexico, on a greater scale
than their Indian counterparts. Yet, Indian companies
have often demonstrated a greater skill in acting as
local players (employing local managers and workers)
and at becoming perceived as members of the local
community than have their Chinese counterparts.
In the banking and finance sectors, Chinese banks
have made significant advances in Latin America,
including not only more than $125 billion lent to the
region in the past decade, but also the expansion into
branch banking in the Southern Cone, as well as currency swaps in support of conducting transactions
in Chinese yuan or (RMB). By contrast, Indian banks
have been almost entirely absent from Latin America
in all three of these areas.
In logistics and port operations, Chinese companies have a modest but growing presence built around
the Hong Kong-based firm Hutchison Whampoa, and
the shipping companies, China Shipping and China
Overseas Shipping Company (COSCO). As in banking, Indian firms have been almost entirely absent
from this sector.
Both Chinese and Indian companies have made
important advances in Latin American technology
sectors, yet the types of technologies and the principal markets for each are different. Chinese companies
have built a significant presence in telecommunications from the ground up through the firm Huawei
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and, to a lesser extent, ZTE. China has also developed
and launched satellites for, and built space infrastructure in, Latin America. Indian companies, by contrast,
have established a significant presence in the biotechnology and software development sectors of Latin
America, in which China is almost completely absent.
India has also become a major local employer through
call centers and other technology services companies.
With respect to military engagement, Chinese companies have sold an increasing quantity of arms to the
ALBA countries and Peru, including aircraft, radars,
and military vehicles, while Indian arms sales have
been limited to the sale of Mahindra military trucks
and an ill-fated contract to supply light helicopters to
Ecuador.
The Chinese military has participated in a variety
of bilateral and multilateral military activities in the
region, including the sending of its hospital ship, the
“Peace Arc,” to the region in 2011 and 2015, as well
as combat exercises with Chile in 2013. Virtually all
of the Latin American states that recognize the PRC
have sent military officers to education and training
programs in China; People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
soldiers have attended Latin American training programs such as those in Tolemaida, Colombia, and
Manaus, Brazil. By contrast, Indian military contact
with counterparts in Latin America has been limited
to occasional institutional visits and participation
in the naval exercise, Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC)
in 2014.
While Chinese activities in Latin America have
thus generally eclipsed those of India, the nature of
Indian companies and their engagement with the region creates opportunities for significant advances in
the future, in a manner that is viewed positively by
Latin American governments and societies.
xvi

On one hand, the type of engagement by Indian
firms in Latin America and the sectors in which they
are concentrated make them appear less “threatening” to the governments and people of the region
than their Chinese counterparts, with less competition
from Indian (versus Chinese) products in low-end
manufactured products and greater concentration of
Indian investments on high-value-added technology
and services. In addition, Latin America (as well as the
United States) generally perceives that the PRC, rather
than India, is the principal challenger to the Westernled global order, if such a challenger exists.
At the corporate level, the tendency for Indian
firms to be seen more positively than their Chinese
counterparts is supported by their employment of
relatively more local labor and management, and their
experience in managing risks in complex democracies.
This allows them to relate more effectively than their
Chinese counterparts with local communities, labor
forces, and interest groups.
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INDIAN AND CHINESE ENGAGEMENT IN
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN:
A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT
INTRODUCTION
Since the acceptance of the People’s Republic
of China (PRC) into the World Trade Organization
(WTO) in 2001, China’s expanding economic, political, and military engagement with Latin America and
the Caribbean has received significant attention, both
in the region and in the United States.1 During the
same period, India has also expanded its engagement,
with India-Latin America bilateral trade growing at a
rate similar to that of the PRC with the countries of
the region, albeit from a much lower base. Cumulative
Indian investment in Latin America is approximately
$16 billion,2 a non-trivial sum, yet only slightly more
than the PRC invests in Latin America in a single year.3
The motives for Indian and Chinese engagement
with Latin America are arguably similar: the demand
for petroleum, metals, and minerals to supply domestic industry, and the need to import agricultural goods
to help feed the Chinese and Indian peoples. Other
motives are the search for new markets for the goods
and services offered by Chinese and Indian companies, as well as technology partnerships to help those
companies move up the value-added ladder.
In addition, largely outside the public eye, both
countries have worked to sell military goods to the
region, although PRC-based companies have been far
more successful than their Indian counterparts in this
regard.
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The dynamics and trajectory of both China and India’s engagement with Latin America and the Caribbean is changing. This change is a product of the deceleration of the growth of the Chinese economy as well
as the improving performance of the Indian economy,
on top of important shifts in the world economy, such
as depressed commodity prices and the increasingly
global posture of Latin America and the Caribbean.
This includes the region’s construction of trade and,
more broadly, its financial ties with Asia.
Although much has been written about Chinese
activities in Latin America and the Caribbean,4 very
little has been published regarding Indian engagement with the region. The few important works on the
topic in the Western press include the Inter-American
Development Bank (IDB) report India: Latin America’s
Next Big Thing?5 and India and Latin America and the Caribbean: opportunities and challenges in trade and investment relations, by the Economic Commission for Latin
America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).6 In addition,
Deepak Bhojwani’s Latin America, the Caribbean and India: Promise and Challenge,7 although mostly oriented
toward presenting Latin America to an Indian audience, provides some useful insights about the relationship between the two. Lastly, a number of journalistic
accounts detail the India-Latin America relationship,
including an article in Americas Quarterly by Indian
scholar Hari Seshasayee,8 among others.9
By contrast, the literature on Chinese engagement
with Latin America and the Caribbean is vast and
growing.10
Nonetheless, apart from a recently compiled work
on Chinese and Indian engagement in Latin America
edited by Riordan Roett and Guadalupe Paz,11 there
is no major comparative study of Indian and Chinese

2

engagement with the region. The present work helps
to fill that gap.
This monograph is a comparative assessment of
the contemporary activities of the governments and
companies of the Republic of India and the PRC in
Latin America and the Caribbean, with an emphasis
on engagement during the most recent decade, ending
in 2016. This work examines the high-level diplomacy
employed by each of the two actors, as well as the
volume and patterns of trade, the activities of Indian
and Chinese companies in the region, and their relationship to their respective governments there in eight
sectors. These sectors are: (1) petroleum and mining;
(2) agriculture; (3) construction; (4) manufacturing
and retail; (5) banking and finance; (6) logistics and
port operations; (7) technology, such as telecommunications, space, and high technology; and, (8) military
sales and activities.
This monograph finds that, in general, diplomatic
and economic engagement with Latin America and
the Caribbean by India is less than that of the PRC. It
is concentrated in a more limited subset of countries
and sectors, yet the experience and approach of Indian
companies, and the structure of Indian engagement
with Latin America, positions India to have a more
harmonious and successful engagement than the PRC
in certain areas.
DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT WITH LATIN
AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN
During the period of this study, the PRC has generally made a broader and more concerted diplomatic
effort to engage with the states of Latin America and
the Caribbean than has India, although India has
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developed strong relationships with some countries
in the region. Most recently, under the government
of Prime Minister Modi, India has promised to increase attention to Latin America and other parts of
the world.12
China.
The PRC, for its part, has actively engaged the
states of Latin America and the Caribbean in both bilateral and multilateral forums—focusing diplomacy
principally on economic engagement, with a style that
has varied by country but that has generally refrained
from taking positions on the internal governance of
the countries of the region.13
By the turn of the century, the PRC had established
diplomatic relations with all but 12 states of the region.
Prior to 2008, the fight with Taiwan to win or preserve
diplomatic recognition of the countries in the region
was a prominent feature of PRC diplomacy, particularly in the Caribbean and Central America, where the
states recognizing Taiwan were concentrated.14 With
the informal “truce” between then-Chinese President
Hu Jintao and his Taiwanese predecessor Ma Yingjeou, elected to power in January 2008,15 PRC policy
toward the region shifted to focus more fully on expanding economic and other forms of engagement, including with countries that did not recognize the PRC.
In November 2008, in conjunction with the visit of
Hu Jintao to the region, the PRC published its firstever policy white paper toward Latin America and
the Caribbean, outlining its desire to build stronger
relationships with the region in a broad array of areas,
primarily economic, but also in political, military, and
technology relationships.16
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The assumption of the Chinese Presidency by Xi
Jinping in March 2013 arguably ushered in an era of
greater PRC confidence in engaging with Latin America, less sensitive to the geographical proximity of the
region to the United States and the reaction of the latter. By the end of 2016, President Xi had made three
trips to the region, each with stops in multiple countries, and associated with important new economic
and political initiatives.
Indeed, within 2 months of arriving in office, Xi
made a major trip to the region, including three stops
all north of Panama, with 11 bilateral leader-to-leader
discussions, before meeting with then-U.S. President
Obama in California. In July of the following year,
President Xi returned to the region with four stops,
all focused on countries with which the United States
had difficult political relations: Brazil, Cuba, Venezuela, and Argentina.
In addition, the trip featured President Xi’s attendance at the Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South
Africa (BRICS) summit in Fortaleza, Brazil, and the
first-ever summit between China and the states of Latin America and the Caribbean. Moreover, his choice
to engage with the region through the Community of
Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), an organization that excludes the United States and Canada, rather than through the Organization of American
States (OAS), at which China had been an observer
since 2004, illustrated the growing Chinese confidence
in engaging the region, commensurate with the
nation’s growing economic might.
In general, the focus of PRC diplomacy within the
region has been economic, supporting the efforts of its
companies to win access to the resources, technology,
and markets of the region. Indeed, this posture was
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highlighted by China’s “1+3+6” engagement concept,
promulgated by President Xi during his July 2014
trip to the region: one plan, three axes (trade, finance,
and investment), and six principal engagement areas
(energy and resources, infrastructure construction,
agriculture, manufacturing, scientific and technological innovation, and information technologies).17 These
engagement areas were consistent with those areas in
which the Chinese Government has sought to help its
companies engage in the region to date.18
In November 2016, President Xi made his third and
arguably most significant trip to the region. The Chinese leader traveled to Ecuador, Peru, and Chile, and
participated in the Leaders’ Summit of the Asia Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum. The latter was
particularly important, as it was the first major meeting of world leaders following the surprise election of
Donald Trump as President of the United States. The
meeting provided President Xi with the opportunity
to advance not only his nation’s agenda among the
world’s top leaders in that moment of significant uncertainty, but also the Chinese proposal for the Free
Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP), as an alternative to the U.S.-backed Trans-Pacific Partnership. The
latter’s future had been cast into doubt by the election
of Donald Trump in the United States.
As noted previously, the PRC has continuously
emphasized its policy of non-intervention with respect to the internal affairs of other states, such as
those in the region.19 Yet, as Chinese power and its
economic role in the region have expanded, China has
periodically used its influence to shape the policies
of Latin American and Caribbean governments with
respect to the treatment of Chinese companies and
nationals,20 as well as the ethnic Chinese living in
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Latin America and the Caribbean. In August 2013, for
example, during a state visit to the PRC seeking greater Chinese investment in Jamaica, then-Prime Minister
Portia Simpson-Miller was asked by her counterpart,
Chinese Premier Li Keqiang, to do more to secure the
protection of Chinese Jamaicans in Kingston, who
were being reportedly targeted by criminals. Prime
Minister Simpson-Miller was obliged to commit the
Jamaica Constabulary Force to look into the matter, to
give better protection to Chinese businessmen.21
India.
In contrast to Chinese engagement with Latin
America and the Caribbean, India’s diplomatic activities in the region and its posture toward the region
have been relatively low key.
Prior to the election of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in May 2014, Indian leaders and their Latin American counterparts had exchanged occasional
visits, principally involving Brazil, and centered on
summits of the trans-regional groupings of the BRICS
and India, Brazil, and South Africa (IBSA). Indeed, as
a testament to the paucity of contact between India
and Latin America, diplomat Deepak Bhojwani, writing in 2014, characterized the 1968 trip to Latin America by then-Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi as
“the high point of Indian diplomacy with the region
[emphasis added].”22
Although Prime Minister Modi, prior to assuming
power, was expected to expand India’s international
engagement,23 since taking office, high-level IndianLatin American diplomacy has actually been more
limited than it had been previously. As of mid-2016,
Prime Minister Modi’s only visit to Latin America was
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his July 2014 trip to Brazil for the 6th BRICS summit.24
Moreover, while in Brazil, Modi notably did not take
advantage of his visit to make side trips to other countries in the region, as his predecessors had done.
Outside of state visits, Prime Minister Modi met
with Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto, Guyana’s President David Granger, Prime Minister Kenny
Davis Anthony of St. Lucia, and Prime Minister Ralph
Everard Gonsalves of St. Vincent and the Grenadines
on the sidelines of the October 2015, United Nations
(UN) General Assembly session in New York.25 During his encounter with President Peña Nieto of Mexico, Prime Minister Modi also reportedly discussed the
possibility of an Indian state visit to Mexico, but was
not able to identify a time in 2016 that worked for both
leaders.
Indeed, the only significant trip to the region by a
senior Indian diplomat was a visit by the Indian Minister of External Affairs to Guatemala in May 2015.26
Reciprocally, the only significant visits by Latin
American officials to India since Prime Minister Modi
assumed office have been by Guyana’s former President Donald Ramotar, in January 2015,27 and by the
Foreign Ministers of Mexico (March 2016), Brazil (November 2015), and Suriname (January 2015).28 Ecuador’s President Rafael Correa canceled a planned trip
to India in November 2015, citing a political crisis in
his country.29
Nor was the diplomacy of Prime Minister Modi’s
predecessor toward Latin America much more active than his own. During the decade from March
2006 through March 2016, there were only four visits by Indian heads of state to the region, covering
only four states: Brazil, Mexico, Cuba, and Trinidad
and Tobago. Even when trips by Indian External Affairs ministers and the Vice President are counted, the
8

Indian Government has traveled to the region only for
11 major visits since the beginning of 2006.
The record of Latin American official visits to India is not much better, with a total of 20 such visits
to India from the entire region during the decade, including a total of seven visits by heads of state from
Brazil, Mexico, Guyana, Paraguay, and Trinidad and
Tobago.30
Reflecting the relative paucity of economic and
historic ties between India and Latin America, India’s
diplomatic representation in Latin America and the
Caribbean has been limited, with embassies in only 14
of the 33 countries in the region, including only three
countries in the Caribbean: Trinidad and Tobago,
Cuba, and Jamaica.31
As noted previously, at the political level, the special relationship India has with Brazil, among other
actors in the region, is highlighted by the presence
of the two countries in three trans-regional blocks of
countries: the BRICS, IBSA, and Brazil, South Africa,
India and China (BASIC);32 although the IBSA forum
did not realize a scheduled annual summit and has
become inactive in recent years.33
As suggested by the previously presented pattern
of embassies and visits within the Caribbean, India
also arguably has a special relationship with the English-speaking states of the Caribbean through their
shared history within the British Commonwealth and
associated substantial Indian immigration and large
Indian communities in Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana,
and Suriname, as well as those in Brazil and Mexico.
Indeed, for a decade, India has realized an important annual event celebrating its overseas diaspora in
countries such as these, the Pravasi Bharatiya Divas.
Beyond the Caribbean basin, a relatively large Indian community of approximately 20,000 is found in
9

Panama, while other communities, including many
Sikhs, are found in Argentina, Brazil (particularly Sao
Paolo), and Bolivia (Santa Cruz).34 Nonetheless, while
India honors its diaspora, the mere location of large
ethnic Indian communities in other countries has
not been sufficient to make those countries a focus of
Indian foreign policy.35
India’s limited diplomatic engagement with Latin
America arguably reflects a de-prioritization of Latin
America within the Indian foreign policy establishment in general. The position of “Joint Secretary for
Latin America and the Caribbean” within India’s Ministry of External Affairs is a post of less prestige than
an ambassadorial appointment, and has typically not
attracted the most talented and ambitious members of
the Indian bureaucracy. Within the Ministry of External Affairs, Latin America is part of what is known as
“Secretary East,” where it competes for attention with
Asia and other high-priority areas. Although engagement with Latin America is part of India’s engagement with fellow nations of the less developed world,
within such “South-South” diplomacy, India has typically placed more attention on Africa, with which it
has more commonalities. These include a shared colonial past under the English and 20th-century movements for national liberation.
As with the PRC, India has traditionally sought
to avoid pronouncements on the politics and internal
affairs of other states in the region, concentrating instead on the promotion of economic and other ties.
Nonetheless, as in diplomacy—as will be noted
later—support from the Indian Government for
the activities of its businesses in Latin America and
elsewhere is limited at best, and not always well
coordinated.
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TRADE RELATIONSHIP
India’s bilateral trade with the countries of Latin
America and the Caribbean in 2014, according to the
International Monetary Fund, was $46.53 billion, only
about one-sixth of the $285.66 billion in bilateral trade
between the region and the PRC during the same period.36 Yet, India’s balance of trade with Latin America
is more beneficial to the region than that of the PRC,
even if the absolute volume of trade between India
and the region is smaller. In 2014, for example, India
bought $29 billion in goods from the region during
the period and sold $17.53 billion in goods, a relationship of 1.7:1 in the region’s favor. By comparison, the
region sold China $95.38 billion in goods during the
period, but bought $190.38 billion in goods from it, a
balance of 2:1 in China’s favor.37
In addition, the rate of Indian trade growth with
Latin America is comparable to that of the PRC, albeit
from a lower base. India’s $46.53 billion in bilateral
trade with Latin America and the Caribbean in 2014
was 22 times its $2.12 billion in trade with the region in
2000, versus a 24-fold increase in China-Latin America
and the Caribbean trade during the same period.38
Within the region, India’s major export partners
as of 2014 were Brazil ($6.973 billion), Mexico ($2.920
billion), and Colombia ($1.129 billion), which collectively accounted for 72% of the region’s purchases
from the country.
By comparison, the distribution of India’s imports
from the region among Latin American countries was
somewhat more diversified. Its top partners were
Venezuela ($13,199 billion), Brazil ($5.535 billion),
Colombia ($3.554 billion), Mexico ($3.449), Chile
($3.182 billion), and Argentina ($2.015 billion), which
collectively accounted for 92% of Indian purchases
11

from the region.39 Two of India’s most important imports from the region were petroleum and soy products, with India importing approximately $20 billion
in petroleum during 2014 (mostly from Venezuela
and Brazil), and $2 billion of soy products during the
period (mostly from Brazil and Argentina).40
India’s relationship with Venezuela is unusually significant, in light of the ongoing political and
economic collapse of the Bolivarian Socialist regime
there. As of 2015, 11.4% of India’s oil imports came
from Venezuela, second only to its oil imports from
Saudi Arabia.41
With respect to products, India, like China, sells a
range of manufactured goods to Latin America and
the Caribbean, but in contrast to the PRC, these goods
are relatively more concentrated on high-value-added
products. Examples include Indian motorcycles by
producers such as Hero and Bajaj; tractors by Mahindra; some cars, such as the Tata Nano in Mexico; and
light trucks, including sales by Daimler India Commercial Vehicles in Trinidad and Tobago.42
Perhaps one of India’s most successful commercial
product offerings in Latin America is that of Indian
pharmaceutical companies, which are well established
in the region.43 Leading Indian pharma firms in the
Latin American market include Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories, Cipla, Natco Pharma, Lupin, and Glenmark—
with Brazil and Mexico being the two principal markets for Indian companies there.44
With respect to agreements facilitating trade, the
PRC is relatively more advanced than India. During
the past decade, China has signed free trade agreements (FTAs) with Costa Rica, Peru, and Chile, the
latter of which includes a supplementary agreement
in services.45 The PRC is also reportedly interested
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in negotiating other FTAs with partners such as
Colombia.46
For its part, India has a preferential trade agreement with Mercosur, which entered into force in
2009,47 and a partial trade agreement with Chile that
India is considering expanding.48 To date, India has no
bilateral FTAs with countries in the region,49 although
it is reportedly considering limited agreements with
Chile, Peru, and Mexico.50
Petroleum and Mining.
Both Chinese and Indian companies are significant
investors in the petroleum and mining sectors of Latin
America and the Caribbean, and are major purchasers
of the region’s exports in those sectors. Nonetheless,
Chinese companies have generally been larger buyers
of goods in those areas, and have an ownership share
in petroleum and mining companies in a greater number of Latin American countries. Yet, Indian companies are generally positioned in higher-value-added
activities there.
China.
In the petroleum sector, Chinese companies maintained a limited presence in Venezuela, Peru, and
Ecuador during the first decade of the century. However, they began significantly expanding their presence after 2010, with acquisitions focused on acquiring ownership of, or minority shares in, companies
with proven reserves requiring an injection of capital
to develop.51
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The most significant cases beginning during this
period include the Chinese firm Sinochem’s $3.1 billion purchase of the Brazilian operations of Statoil,52
Sinopec’s $7.1 billion investment in the Brazilian operation of the Spanish firm Repsol,53 Sinopec’s purchase
of Occidental Petroleum for $2.4 billion,54 and China
National Offshore Oil Corporation’s (CNOOC’s) acquisition of Bridas.55 Other major deals that followed
include Sinopec’s $3.1 billion purchase of the Ecuadoran operations of Repsol56 and CNOOC’s $15.1
billion purchase of Nexxen in 2013, giving the new
owner significant petroleum assets in Colombia and
other Latin American companies.57
Chinese companies have also spent billions of dollars to acquire minority stakes in companies in the
region, including Sinopec’s purchase of 30% of Galp
energy for $4.8 billion58 and Sinochem’s acquisition
of a 10% stake in Perenco, with important holdings in
Brazil.59
As Chinese companies have advanced in their technical capabilities and knowledge of the region, they
have also entered into competitive public procurements. These include petroleum projects that are more
exploratory in character, such as the winning bids by
China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and
CNOOC, to participate in development of the Libra
oil field offshore from Brazil.60
In the mining industry, as in the petroleum sector,
Chinese companies have focused on purchasing small
companies to acquire rights to existing mineral deposits, then injecting capital to exploit the mine. The focus
of such efforts had been in Peru, including the Toromocho, Galleno, Pampa de Pongo, Don Javier, and
Rio Blanco mines,61 although they have also acquired
rights to important mineral reserves in Brazil through
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the acquisition of Itaminas; in Ecuador, by buying Corriente; and in Argentina, with Sierra Grande.62 In parallel to the petroleum sector, they have also acquired
large minority stakes in important projects, such as a
Chinese consortium’s $1.95 billion purchase of a 10%
share in Brazilian Metallurgy and Mining Company
(Companhia Brasileira de Metalurgia e Mineração
[CBMM]), which controls mines with valuable rare
earth elements.63
India.
In contrast to Chinese companies, Indian petroleum and mining companies have been active in the
region in a smaller number of countries, on a smaller
scale. The majority of Indian investments in the sector
have been realized by India’s state oil company Oil
and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. (ONGC) Videsh, although other Indian companies such as Reliance buy
oil from Latin America for processing in the nation’s
refineries and frequently export products such as diesel. India purchases approximately 400,000 barrels of
oil per day from Venezuela, 100,000 barrels per day
each from Brazil and Mexico, and 50,000 barrels per
day each from Colombia and Ecuador.64
Although India’s presence in Latin America’s petroleum sector is less than that of the PRC, it is nonetheless significant. As of the end of 2013, eight Indian
oil companies had presence on the ground through
a total of 12 joint ventures in six countries in the region: Venezuela, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Cuba,
and Peru. The companies included ONGC, Reliance
Industries, Essar Oil, Bharat Petroleum Corporation
Ltd. (BPCL), Oil India, Videocon Industries, Assam
Company, and Indian Oil Corporation.65
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ONGC has established a significant presence in
Venezuela and a lesser presence in Colombia and Brazil. The firm has invested an estimated $3 billion in
the oil sectors of Venezuela, Colombia, and Brazil,66
and has demonstrated an intention to participate in
the newly opened Mexican petroleum sector.67
In Venezuela, ONGC has been present since 2008,
when it forged a partnership with the Venezuelan
state petroleum company Petroindovenezolana (PDVSA) to develop the San Cristobal block in the Venezuelan tar sands.68 The joint venture was followed in
2010 by a second one, Petrocarabobo (also involving
India Oil), focusing on the Carabobo-1 block, ceded
by the Malaysian firm Petronas as it withdrew from
the country. Both are currently producing oil, with the
output of San Cristobal estimated at 30,000 barrels per
day, and Petrocarabobo expected to produce 400,000
barrels per day eventually.69 Nonetheless, ONGC is
reportedly owed approximately $500 million by PDVSA, and has had a less than positive experience in
the country.70
Beyond ONGC and India Oil, the Indian companies Reliance and Essar, operating in Venezuela, together purchase up to 600,000 barrels per day of relatively heavy, high-impurity oil from the Venezuela tar
sands and process it in large specially tooled refineries
in India.71
A major milestone in India’s advance in Venezuela’s oil sector was the September 2013 summit between
Indian Energy and Mines Minister Veerapa Moily and
head of PDVSA Rafael Ramirez,72 which was followed
by a visit to Caracas the following month by an Indian delegation and produced new commitments by
India to invest in the sector, including an agreement
with Reliance to evaluate the Ayacucho-3 block.73 The

16

Indian companies Essar and Oil India have also
signed agreements with PDVSA for infrastructure and
services to transport Venezuelan oil.74
In addition, Indian companies at the time were
reportedly also interested in other Venezuelan oil
blocks, including Ayacucho 3 and Boyaca-4.75 In the
end, however, with the deepening difficulties in the
Venezuelan economy, few of the contemplated Indian
investments in Venezuela went forward.
Beyond Venezuela, in 2006, ONGC made a modest but important advance in the Latin American petroleum sector in Colombia when it joined with its
Chinese counterpart, CNPC, to collectively purchase
a controlling interest in the oil company Omimex, renaming the newly acquired firm Mansroavar.76
The other focus of Indian companies in the Latin
America petroleum sector has been Brazil, where
ONGC has reportedly invested 700 million dollars to
acquire offshore oil blocs near Rio de Janeiro. ONGC,
in combination with the Indian company Gail, entered
a joint venture with Petrobras through which the Brazilian firm obtained a 30% stake in an oilfield in the
Krishna-Godavari basin in India, but Petrobras pulled
out of the joint venture in 2010 to concentrate on the
development of oil at home.77
Beyond ONGC and Gail, smaller Indian companies have also been engaged in exploratory activities
in Brazil. Examples include Bharat Petroleum Resources, which, during the expansive phase of Brazil’s
oil development, acquired ten blocks, including offshore holdings, from the Canadian company EnCana
for $165 million.78
In addition, the Indian company Reliance has a
small bitumen refinery in Trinidad and Tobago.79
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Finally, ONGC has established an office in Mexico,
where it participated unsuccessfully in the first round
of Mexican oil-sector auctions,80 and is expected to
participate in future bids as the country opens up its
oil sector.81
With respect to the mining sector, the activities by
Indian companies are generally concentrated in exploratory and engineering services activities, and are
generally smaller than those of their Chinese counterparts in the region.
The major Indian mining investments in the region, to date, have occurred in Peru, Brazil, and Bolivia, although Indian companies also have a mining
presence in Chile and Mexico.
In Peru, the Indian company Indian Farmers Fertiliser Cooperative Ltd. (IFFCO) has a significant mining
operation extracting phosphates and potash for export
to India. Indeed, because of the IFFCO investment,
approximately one quarter of all Peruvian phosphate
production is reportedly exported to India.82
In Brazil, India’s most significant presence in the
sector is the Aditya Birla group, whose subsidiary
Novelis operates aluminum rolling and casting facilities in the country83 at Pinda and San André,84 accounting for $2.5 billion of the group’s $40 billion in
global revenues.85
Another example of Indian participation in the
Latin American mining sector is the firm Minenergy
Resources, which has acquired mines in the Brazilian
state of Tocantins in a joint venture with fellow Indian
mining firm Neepaz Mineral Resources.86 Minenergy
also has rights to territory and is exploring for diamonds in Brazil’s Parana state.87
In Bolivia, the Indian firm Jindal made a $2 billion
commitment to develop the Mutún iron deposit in
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eastern Bolivia, but the company became enmeshed
in a series of conflicts with the Bolivian government,
which ultimately terminated in the company withdrawing from the country and initiating a lawsuit.88
At the same time, in comparison to the PRC, India also has a relatively larger concentration of firms
higher up the value-added chain in the metals sector. Examples include Essar Steel, which has a plant
in Guyana,89 and Tega Industries, which operates an
abrasives plant in Chile.90
Nonetheless, such Indian ventures are relatively
modest and, in contrast to Chinese companies, are
generally oriented toward supplying local needs rather than serving the Indian domestic market, since consumers in India can obtain needed quantities of metals
more cheaply in India itself, or from closer suppliers,
such as in Australia. Indeed, multiple Indian experts
consulted for this study emphasized that Indian companies are generally not competitive in the region
against the larger multinational firms, such as those
of Australia.
Agriculture.
Although China and India are competing purchasers of Latin American foodstuffs, particularly in Argentina and Brazil, Chinese companies have tried to
invest and build a presence in the region in ways that
Indian companies have not.
China.
To acquire needed agricultural goods for the Chinese people, PRC-based firms have purchased food
and animal fodder, such as soybeans, through inter-
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national agricultural conglomerates such as Archer
Daniels Midland Company (ADM), Dreyfuss, Bunge,
and Cargill.91 They have also tried, with limited success, to build their own agro-industrial complexes in
the region to acquire, store, and transport foodstuffs to
the PRC. Prominent examples include the firm Beidahuang, which attempted to grow and store soybeans
on leased land in Rio Negro, Argentina, and launched
similar projects in Brazil by Sanhe Hopeful and
Chongqing Grain, none of which have made substantial
progress.92
On a more modest, but still significant, scale, the
Chinese wholesale purchaser China National Cereals,
Oils and Foodstuffs Corporation (COFCO) has begun
to build agro-industrial facilities in the region and to
obtain agricultural technologies by buying companies
with existing capabilities. The two principal cases,
both in 2014, are COFCO’s acquisition of Nidera for
$1.2 billion93 and its purchase of H.K. Noble for $1.5
billion.94
In addition to animal fodder, reflecting both political exigencies and China’s demand for food, the
PRC has also increasingly imported meat and other
products for human consumption from the region.95
India.
In contrast to China, Indian firms have not invested in agriculture in Latin America as much as in food
processing.
Since 2009, the Indian firm Shree Renuka Sugars
has operated four sugar refineries in Latin America
and the Caribbean under the brand Renuka, including
buying two companies in Brazil for $600 million, in
order to produce ethanol (as well as sugar).96 The com-
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pany’s bottom line, however, was prejudiced by low
international sugar prices and, in September 2015, it
filed for bankruptcy.97 Similarly, the Indian company
Praj Industries has built ethanol production plants in
Brazil and Colombia,98 while Olam, operating out of
Singapore, has leased land in Argentina to produce
peanut oil for export to India.99
Construction.
Construction in Latin America and the Caribbean
is one of the sectors in which the difference in profile between Chinese and Indian companies is most
dramatic. Backed by well-resourced partner financial
institutions, as well as by their government, Chinese
construction firms have won an increasing number of
significant projects, particularly in the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA) countries and in the
smaller nations of the Caribbean. Additionally, these
projects have attracted Chinese loan-based financing,
even when the financing of these projects requires the
use of Chinese companies and workers. By contrast,
Indian construction firms, which lack significant experience outside their own region and are generally
at capacity building in India itself and also cannot
leverage ample financing from Indian financial partners, have almost no presence in Latin America and
the Caribbean.
China.
PRC-based companies such as China Railway
Road, Sinohydro, China Harbour, and China Water
and Electric have won considerable business in Latin
America and the Caribbean through projects negotiat-
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ed partly at the government-to-government level and
financed by Chinese banking partners. Chinese companies have been particularly successful with infrastructure projects in countries that have turned away
from Western institutions for financing, or whose
policies or economic situation has restricted access to
such capital, including Argentina, the ALBA regimes,
and the small island nations of the Caribbean. In recent years, however, they have begun to successfully
participate in competitive public procurements in
countries such as Colombia as well.
In the cases of Venezuela and Ecuador, Chinese
loans for construction projects have been secured by
parallel contracts for repaying the debt through the
delivery of oil; although in other cases, such as the
$7.5 billion line of credit extended to Bolivia to fund
Chinese construction projects and other activities in
the country, the vehicle for securing repayment has
been less clear.100 Projects built with such funds include hydroelectric facilities in Ecuador, Honduras,
Belize, Argentina, and Bolivia; thermoelectric facilities in Venezuela and Guatemala; a possible nuclear
plant and railway infrastructure in Argentina; and
road projects in Bolivia, Suriname, Jamaica, and the
Bahamas, among other countries.101 In Brazil, the Chinese electricity company State Grid has invested in
the country and won important contracts for power
transmission infrastructure, including one to connect
the Belo Monte hydroelectric facility to the national
power grid.102
Chinese companies have also publicly discussed
a number of infrastructure “megaprojects” with governments of the region, such as Atlantic-Pacific “dry
canal” railroad links across the south of Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, and Colombia, as well as an inter-
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oceanic railroad corridor from Bayovar, Peru, to Açu,
Brazil.103 Yet to date, none of these megaprojects has
gone forward. In addition, although the Chinese Government has not publicly associated itself with the announced transoceanic canal across Nicaragua spearheaded by Chinese businessman Wang Jing, Chinese
companies are likely to finance substantial portions
of the project and participate in its construction if the
canal is indeed built.104
While most Chinese activity in the construction
sector has been paid for by governments in the region
through loans from Chinese banks, a small amount,
particularly in the Caribbean, has been paid for by
Chinese investors or the Chinese construction companies themselves. Prominent examples include the
failed $3.5 billion Baha Mar resort project in the Bahamas, financed in part by China State Construction and
Engineering Corporation,105 and the North-South toll
highway in Jamaica.106
India.
With few exceptions, Indian companies are almost
completely absent from the construction sector in Latin America and the Caribbean. The few exceptions include the Deli Metro Rail Corporation (DMRC), which
reportedly discussed, but ultimately did not participate in, construction of a proposed metro rail project
in Bogota, Colombia. Previously, the Indian company
Rites had a 5% stake in a railroad line across Colombia, but the project was never completed.
In the energy generation sector, the Indian firm D.
S. Construction has acquired a 50% interest in Globeleq America for $542 million, giving it access to 2.2
megawatts of natural gas and hydroelectric power
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plants in Nicaragua and Bolivia, as well as smaller
electricity generation assets in various other states.107
Yet, it is not clear whether the firm intends to use its
presence to win contracts for the construction of other
electricity generation assets, as the Chinese company
State Grid has done.
Indian experts consulted for this report provided
various explanations for the lack of an Indian presence in the sector, including the argument that Indian
companies have sufficient work within India itself and
often do not see benefit in pursuing projects abroad.
These Indian companies do not see the benefit as sufficient to overcome the difficulties of pursuing work
abroad.
In addition, reportedly, few Indian companies
have experience operating in Latin America.
In contrast to large Chinese construction companies, whose pursuit of work in Latin America is supported by the Chinese Government and banking partners, Indian experts felt that the Indian embassies in
Latin America generally had few resources and were
not well positioned to support the efforts of individual
Indian companies to win work projects in the region.
In addition, the Export-Import Bank of India, a logical
source of financing, is seen as too encumbered by bureaucratic procedures to support such initiatives in an
agile fashion.
Manufacturing and Retail.
Both China and India have a significant presence in
the manufacturing and retail sectors of Latin America
and the Caribbean, although with different areas of
emphasis. While a small number of Indian companies
such as Bajaj and Mahindra have sold products to the
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region for a longer time than their Chinese counterparts, more Chinese manufacturers have moved more
aggressively to establish final assembly facilities in
major markets such as Brazil and Mexico than have
their Indian counterparts. Chinese manufacturers
have also established a more significant presence in
the white goods sector across the region than have
their Indian counterparts. Yet, although the advances
in their commercial presence in manufacturing and
retail have been more limited, Indian companies have
often demonstrated greater skill in acting as local
players than have their Chinese counterparts.
China.
China’s presence in the Latin American manufacturing sector is characterized by a relatively diverse
array of companies, working in coordination with local partners in sectors from consumer appliances to
motorcycles, and from cars to heavy equipment, as
well as other goods.108
Relatively low-technology Chinese manufactured
goods such as toys, shoes, clothing, and consumer
electronics were initially sold to the region through
Western manufacturers or importers, although the
Chinese goods manufacturers Gree and Haier established manufacturing facilities in Manaus, Brazil, under their own names, in 2000 and 2005, respectively.
Like white goods, Chinese motorcycles began appearing in the region in the late-1990s, with importers,
such as the brands Jialing109 and Jincheng,110 establishing manufacturing facilities in Colombia at a relatively
early date. Yet, other than these pioneers, the expansion of Chinese motorcycle sales to the region began
to take off in the early-2000s.
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The sale of Chinese cars, trucks, and commercial
vehicles, such as the brands Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation (SAIC), Anhui Jianghuai Automobile Corporation (JAC),111 Foton,112 Chery,113 and Great
Wall began to take off in the region a few years later,
in the late-2000s, eventually leading those companies
and their local partners to establish final assembly facilities in countries with large markets, such as Brazil
and Mexico, although a smaller number of Chinese
car companies, such as Foton, also began to consider
establishing plants in smaller economies with mature
markets, such as Colombia.
The trajectory of Chinese heavy equipment producers paralleled that of the automotive sector. Chinese products were initially introduced through local
dealers, eventually leading Chinese firms, in conjunction with their local partners, to build final assembly
facilities in large market countries. Examples include
the Chinese private firm Sany Heavy Industries, which
built a factory in São Paulo,114 as well as the Chinese
state-owned enterprise Xuzhou Construction Machinery Group (XCMG), which built a tractor factory in
Minas Gerais in 2012.115
India.
Manufacturing and retail is one of a small number
of sectors in which Indian companies have had a longstanding, albeit modest, presence in Latin America
and the Caribbean. A number of Indian manufactured
goods companies have sold their products in the region for a decade or more. In the motorized vehicle
sector, including autos, motorcycles, and other vehicles, Indian companies sold $1.82 billion in products
to the region in 2014, accounting for 24% of India’s
exports in the sector globally.116
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Nonetheless, few Indian manufacturers have
established production facilities in the country.
One of the principal examples is the well-known
Indian firm Mahindra, which has sold agricultural
and farm equipment in the region since the 1990s. Its
facilities in the region include a joint venture to produce 4-wheel drive vehicles in Manaus,117 as well as
plans for a tractor factory in Venezuela and a possible
assembly facility for its motorcycles in Guatemala.118
The company Bajaj has sold motorcycles in Latin
America, including the popular Pulsar line, as well
as three-wheeled vehicles. The company has an established retail network throughout the region, and
its motorcycles are considered a market leader in
Colombia and Central America.119 The company also
set up production facilities in Mexico,120 Brazil,121 and
Nicaragua.122
Beyond Mahindra and Bajaj, the Indian Company
Hero Motorcorp built a motorcycle production facility in Villa Rica, Colombia, which was inaugurated in
September 2015, with a capacity to produce 150,000
units per year.123 The Indian company, TVS Motor
Company Ltd., is also an important seller of Indian
motorcycles in the region, but has yet to build a production facility there.124
In the automotive sector, the Indian conglomerate
Tata is building a $750 million production facility for
Land Rover automobiles,125 and has reportedly considered building a production facility in the region for
its inexpensive Nano automobile. However, Tata has
reportedly not yet decided whether to construct the
facility in Mexico or Brazil.126
Also in Brazil, the Indian heavy equipment producer BEML (formerly known as Bharat Earth Movers
Ltd.) has built a plant for manufacturing earthmoving
and mining machinery, as well as railway cars.127
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The Indian firm Wipro maintains facilities in five
cities in Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina,128 including a
facility that was set up in October 2008 for its subsidiary AmBev, the largest brewery in Latin America.
Beyond the motorized vehicle industry, the Indian
wind turbine producer Suzlon, in August 2010, invested $10 million to set up a plant in Brazil to produce
2MW wind turbines.129 It has installed an estimated
750MW of wind generation capacity in Brazil alone,
focused on the states of Ceará and Rio Grande do
Norte. Suzlon is also reportedly investing $20 million
to set up a new Latin American headquarters in Brazil,
and is pursuing projects to install up to an additional
400MW in Chile, Uruguay, and Mexico.130
Further examples of Indian manufacturing investments in the region include Elgi Equipments, which
invested in a facility in Sao Paolo to market and distribute its compressors with the intention of manufacturing the units there.131
In the chemicals manufacturing sector, the Indian company UPL Ltd. (formerly known as United
Phosphorus Ltd.) operates in Brazil, Colombia, and
Argentina.132
In addition, in 2006, the Indian company Pidilite
acquired the Brazilian firm Pulvitec do Brazil to produce consumer adhesives, maintenance products, and
other construction products in that country, although
Pidilite is reportedly in the process of divesting itself
of the company, which has been incurring losses.133
Banking and Finance.
In the financial sector, Chinese banks have made
significant advances in the region, including loans,
branch banking, currency swaps, and other financial
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and legal arrangements to facilitate the conduct of
business by their commercial partners. By contrast,
Indian banks have been almost entirely absent from
Latin America in supporting Indian firms and commerce in such areas.
China.
For more than a decade, China’s principal policy
banks, led by China Development Bank and China
Export Import Bank, have lent more than $124 billion
to the region,134 including participation in multilateral
funds that the PRC has proposed to advance its projects in the region.135 In addition, more commercially
oriented Chinese banks, such as the Industrial Commerce Bank of China (ICBC) and China Construction
Bank (CCB), have followed their Chinese commercial
partners into the region, setting up representation
offices to provide legal and other services for them.
More recently, these banks have entered into branch
banking in the Southern Cone, purchasing Standard
Bank to obtain a branch banking presence in Argentina;136 and, in 2013, BicBanco’s acquisition of CCB,
which helped the Chinese acquire a branch banking
presence in Brazil.137 In addition, Chinese banks have
participated in multiple debt-swap agreements with
countries in the region to create clearing mechanisms
and facilitate transactions directly between Chinese
and Latin American firms, including a $30 billion
debt-swap agreement with Brazil,138 an $11 billion
agreement with Argentina,139 and a $3.5 billion agreement with Chile.140
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India.
Indian banks have not followed their corporate
partners into Latin America, nor into other parts of
the world, the way that Chinese firms have. Indeed,
Indian firms reportedly complain over their inability
to obtain capital at competitive rates when they go
abroad.141 In contrast to Chinese companies, Indian
financial firms have not yet ventured into branch
banking in the region, and there are currently no large
“currency swap” agreements between Indian and
Latin American governments or banks to facilitate the
conduct of transactions.
While India, like China, has a government-backed
export-import bank, that institution has lent a relatively miniscule $200 million to the region. The procedures required by the bank to obtain loans are reportedly cumbersome and time consuming, and its terms
are reportedly not significantly better than funds from
other development banks active in the region, such as
the IDB or the Corporación Andina de Fomento (CAF).
Nonetheless, India may be interested in expanding its
financial cooperation with the region. In March 2016,
Bolivian Minister of Planning and Development Rene
Orellana visited India, where he met with the ExportImport Bank of India, and where his Indian counterparts expressed interest in strengthening India-Bolivia
financial ties.142
Logistics and Port Operations.
In the logistics and port operations sectors, Chinese companies have a modest but growing presence,
built principally around the Hong Kong-based firm
Hutchison Whampoa, and the shipping companies
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China Shipping and China Overseas Shipping Company (COSCO). Conversely, Indian firms are almost
entirely absent from the sector.
China.
The visible expansion of PRC-based companies in
the logistics sector in Latin America and the Caribbean began in 1999, when the Panamanian Government
awarded concessions for the operation of the ports of
Cristobal and Balboa, on either side of the Panama Canal, as the Canal was returned to Panamanian control
by the U.S. Government. In the years that followed,
Hutchison also won important port concessions in the
Bahamas, Mexico, Argentina, and Ecuador. Yet, despite concern in the United States regarding the new
Chinese presence represented by Hutchison in the region, the firm has generally administered each of the
ports in its control in a fashion comparable to that of
other multinational logistics companies.
Since 1999, Hutchison has gradually acquired logistics sector assets, such as warehouses and other
consolidation facilities, that complement the ports it
operates in the region. Yet, the company has not established presence at a major new port since 2009, when
it withdrew from the port of Manta, Ecuador, due to a
dispute with the national government.143
In parallel to Hutchison, both China Shipping and
COSCO have expanded their commercial cargo service from Asia to Latin America in recent years. The
two companies are now merging and are poised for
further expansion in the region.144
Beyond maritime logistics, the company China
Airport Holdings currently operates six airports in
Colombia, but otherwise has no presence in Latin
America.145
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India.
In contrast to Chinese companies in the logistics
sector, there are no Indian port or airport management companies active in Latin America or the Caribbean. Nor, with the exception of the small company
TCI Global Brazil Logistica in the energy sector,146 are
there any Indian shipping companies comparable to
the Chinese companies COSCO and China Shipping.
As one Indian expert put it, “India simply isn’t known
globally for such things.”147
Technology Sectors.
Both Chinese and Indian companies have made
important advances in the technology sectors in Latin
America and the Caribbean, yet the types of technologies, and the countries that serve as the principal markets and partners for each, are very different. China’s
most significant advances in the area have been in the
construction of telecommunications infrastructure,
the sale of telecommunications products, and other
electronic goods, as well as in satellites, space infrastructure, and space launch services. Indian companies, by contrast, have played a significant role in biotechnology, software development, call centers, and
other technology services.
China.
In South America, and increasingly in Central
America and the Caribbean, the Chinese companies
Huawei and ZTE have built a significant business selling telephones and telecommunications devices, as
well as constructing telecommunications infrastruc-
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ture for governments and private service providers.
In contrast to the presence of Chinese companies in
other sectors, Huawei and ZTE have had to integrate
their own managerial and technical personnel with local staff, necessary for the sales and customer service
“public face” of the company in the countries in which
they operate.
In space services, China’s National Space Administration and its space services provider, Great Wall Industries, have developed and launched four satellites
for Brazil, two for Venezuela, and one for Bolivia,148 as
well as the launch of the Pegasus microsatellite for Ecuador. Such projects have included Chinese construction of space-ground-control infrastructure for both
Venezuela and Bolivia, and the training of personnel
for both newly created space programs in the PRC.
The PRC has also built a deep space radar tracking
facility in a remote part of Neuquén, Argentina,149 as a
laser range-finding capability at Argentina’s San Juan
Observatory,150 and has tried unsuccessfully to win
contracts to develop and launch satellites for Chile
and Argentina.151
India.
Indian companies have a presence in the Latin
American technology sectors that is comparable to
that of their Chinese counterparts, but in a different mixture of specific industries. Whereas Chinese
companies are concentrated principally in telecommunications, consumer electronics, and space launch
services, Indian companies play a significant role in
pharmaceuticals, consulting, and technical services,
and only secondarily, in telecommunications.
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Pharmaceutical companies were among the first
Indian companies to set up shop in Latin America, entering the region in the 1990s at the invitation of local
governments seeking to bring down health costs associated with name-brand pharmaceuticals. Initially,
Indian companies sold their products into established
distribution infrastructures in the region. Later, they
began acquiring companies with a retail pharmaceutical presence in the region to realize the profits from
this more lucrative portion of the pharmaceutical supply chain.152 In 2014, Indian pharmaceutical companies sold more than $1 billion in goods to the region,
of which Brazil purchased $374 million; followed by
Venezuela, which bought $146 million; and Mexico,
which bought $126 million in Indian pharmaceutical
products.153
Currently, Indian pharmaceutical companies in
Latin America are concentrated in Mexico and Brazil. Major Indian companies include Dr. Reddy’s, Sun
Pharma, Glenmark, and Claris, as well as Stride Arco
Labs, Aurobindo, and Zydus Cadilla and the former
Ranbaxy before its 2015 acquisition by Sun.154 Nonetheless, Indian pharmaceutical companies operate
throughout the region, with pharmaceuticals being
India’s principal export to Venezuela.155
Of the aforementioned companies, Strides Arcolabs, Glenmark, and Ranbaxy-Sun Pharma have manufacturing facilities in Brazil, and Aurobindo has a
warehouse there.156 Similarly, in 2007, the Indian firm
Zydus Cadilla acquired the pharmaceutical company
Nikkho for $26 million, with a production facility in
Rio de Janeiro.157
Although, as noted previously, the Indian companies Dr. Reddy’s, Glenmark, and Claris Injectables
operate in Venezuela, the progressive collapse of the
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Venezuelan economy has prevented them from repatriating their profits for almost 2 years.158
Beyond pharmaceuticals, Indian companies also
employ a significant number of people in call centers
in Latin America, leveraging the region’s combination
of relatively low labor costs and alignment with U.S.
and Canadian time zones to serve those two markets.
Along with pharmaceutical firms, Indian call centers
and related technology service companies entered the
Latin American market approximately 15 years ago.
Indian call centers and technology services companies
employ an estimated 25,000 persons in the sector.159
Key players include Tata Consultancy Services (TCS),
Wipro, Infosys, and Aegis, although there are also
multiple “second tier” players operating in the region.
In Mexico alone, Indian technology companies
employ 6,000-7,000 people, including TCS, Infosys,
Wipro, NIIT Technologies, BirlaSoft, HCL Technologies, Aptech, Hexaware Technologies, and Patni
Computer Systems.160
Beyond call center activities such as Information
Technology (IT) support, other activities of Indian
technology services companies in the region include
software development. The Indian firm TCS, for example, has become a relatively important player in
Brazil, employing an estimated 1,500 persons in software development centers in Brasilia, São Paulo, and
Campinas.
The Indian firm Infosys Technologies opened a
software development and an accounting and technology services center in Brazil in 2009. It currently
employs a total of 1,700 people in Brazil, Mexico,
Argentina, and Colombia.161
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Similarly, the Indian firm Wipro has operations in
three Latin American countries in five cities: Curitiba
and São Paulo (Brazil), Buenos Aires (Argentina), and
Mexico City and Monterrey (Mexico).162
Other examples include: Aptech, which in 2009,
opened an IT training center in Brazil with the Brazilian partner Falgo, as well as Manthan Systems, which
opened an office in São Paulo to provide consulting
services for the retail and consumer goods sectors.
Still more Indian IT companies operating in the region
include Mann-India, Tech Mahindra, HCL Technologies, Genpact, Patni Computer Systems, Cognizant,
Crisil/Irevna, Copal Partners, E-Valueserve, Cellent
AG, Amba Research, WNS Global Services, Idhasoft
Ltd., CSS Corp, i-flex Solutions India Ltd. (now Oracle
Financial Services Software Ltd.), Sasken Communications, Geodesic Ltd., Hexaware Technologies, Polaris Software, Sutherland Global Services, and UST
Global.163
As suggested by the numbers provided in the preceding paragraphs, in contrast to Chinese companies,
Indian companies have been obligated from a relatively early point in time to hire almost exclusively
from the local population. But these companies have
reportedly had sufficient flexibility from their Indian
headquarters companies to adapt to local labor laws
and other regulations.
In contrast to the significant presence of the Chinese firm Huawei, and to a lesser extent ZTE, in the
Latin American and Caribbean telecommunications
sector, there are few Indian telecommunications companies in the region. Examples include the firm Vihaan
Networks Limited (VNL), with a relatively small presence in Bolivia and other parts of the Andean region.
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Other examples include Tata Communication Services, which entered the region by acquiring the Brazil-U.S. undersea cable link.164
In addition, Comviva, the telecommunication electronics arm of the Indian company Mahindra, has a
small presence in the sector, with Latin American sales
accounting for 15% of the firm’s revenues in 2015.165
Military Sales.
To compare Chinese and Indian military engagement with the region, it is important to consider both
the sales of military goods and associated support as
well as other activities, such as training and professional military education programs in the region.
With respect to arms sales, as in commercial sectors, both Chinese and Indian companies are seeking
to sell their goods to the region. Chinese companies,
however, have sold a far larger quantity, and a broader array of arms, to a far greater number of countries
in the region than has India.
China.
Over the past decade, Chinese defense companies
have expanded their client base from the politically
sympathetic regime in Venezuela, to allied regimes in
Bolivia and Ecuador,166 then further to others, such as
the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, and Peru.167 In
the process, they are continuing to broaden the array
of military goods and services that they offer to the
region, and are offering weapon systems of increasing
quality and capability.168
In Venezuela, for example, PRC military companies such as Norinco and the Aviation Industry Cor-
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poration of China (AVIC) have advanced from selling
modest capability K-8 trainer aircraft, to more capable
L-15 fighters169 and VN-1 armored vehicles.170 They
have also moved beyond Venezuela to sell Z-9/H-425
helicopters, military trucks, and busses to Bolivia;171
trucks and T-90B self-propelled artillery vehicles to
Peru,172 and offshore patrol vessels to Trinidad and
Tobago, and possibly to Argentina.173
India.
Sales to Latin America by Indian arms companies
are very modest in comparison with their Chinese
counterparts. They include military helicopter sales
by the state company Hindustan Aeronautics Limited
(HAL) to Ecuador, Suriname, and Peru; the sale of Mahindra military trucks to Argentina, Belize, Honduras,
and Uruguay;174 and collaboration with the Brazilian
company Embraer on an airborne radar system.175
With respect to helicopters, HAL’s advance in
the Latin American arms market has been impeded
by crashes of four of the seven helicopters it sold to
Ecuador, prompting the Ecuadoran military unilaterally to cancel its contract with the company in October
2015.176
Beyond HAL, the Indian company MKU Ltd., also
sells defense goods in Latin America, including body
armor and ammunition. In addition, the Indian commercial company Mahindra sells a limited quantity of
defense goods, such as military trucks, to the region.177
The airborne radar platform built by the Brazilian
company Embraer, with contributions from India’s
Defense Research and Development Organization, has
been relatively successful, with at least three aircraft
developed through this collaboration delivered to
India.178
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Beyond these projects, India and Russia have jointly developed a supersonic missile, BrahMos, which
they have been trying to sell to Chile and other partners in Latin America. In February 2014, the Indian
Ministry of Defense approved the sale of the missile
to foreign partners,179 but to date, no such sales have
occurred.
MILITARY-TO-MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS
With respect to military interactions with Latin
America and the Caribbean, the PRC has been far more
active than India in recent years. Whereas the PRC regularly trains Latin American military personnel, hosts
Latin American officers in its defense institutions, and
conducts regular visits to (and multilateral and bilateral exercises with) the region, the Indian military is
almost absent from the region, with the exception of
educational and other exchanges with Brazil.
China.
As the PRC has expanded its commercial and diplomatic engagement with Latin America and the Caribbean, it has also increased its professional military
education (PME) and training activities there, and has
conducted an expanding array of military exchanges
and exercises with the region.
In the PME arena, the People’s Liberation Army
(PLA) hosts Latin American and Caribbean officers
from virtually all of the states that diplomatically
recognize it, in Chinese institutions such as the Defense Studies Institute in the Changping district of
Beijing, the PLA Army and Navy command schools
in the Nanjing area, and a Special Forces program in
Shijiazhuang.180
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Within Latin America, PLA personnel attend training programs at select Latin American military facilities, such as Tolemaida in Colombia181 and Manaus in
Brazil.
The PRC military presence in the region has progressed from multilateral humanitarian assistance,
such as contributing military police to the UN’s Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) from 2004
through 2012, to bilateral humanitarian engagement,
such as realizing the “Peace Angel” humanitarian exercise with the Peruvian Army in November 2010. The
PRC has also sent its hospital ship, “Peace Arc,” to the
region, on a trip to four countries in the Caribbean in
December 2011;182 and in December 2015, to both the
Pacific and Atlantic coasts of Latin America. In October 2013, it conducted its first bilateral combat exercise
in the region, through a PLA Naval flotilla, which first
engaged with counterparts in Chile183 before making
stops in Argentina and Brazil.184
India.
Although India sends some officers to other parts
of the world for professional exchanges and technical visits, beyond a modest level of activity with Brazil,185 the Indian military has had almost no regular
interactions with the states of Latin America and the
Caribbean. Reflecting such limited ties, India has only
a modest number of defense attachés assigned to the
region, including those assigned to Brazil and Chile.
Indeed, one of the first important engagements
with the region occurred in July 2014, when an Indian
frigate participated alongside Mexico, Chile, Colombia, and Peru in the multinational naval exercise Rim
of the Pacific (RIMPAC).186
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CONCLUSIONS
As this monograph has shown, the magnitude
of Chinese engagement with Latin America and the
Caribbean is consistently greater than Indian engagement with the region across each of the 10 sectors examined. Yet, the character of India’s engagement in
many of those areas suggests that its relationship with
the region could prove more harmonious and more
resilient than that of China. Indeed, with the evolution
of the Indian economy, Indian Government policies,
and the global environment, India could eventually
surpass China with respect to the level and quality of
its relations in key sectors, and could become both an
important partner with—and a competitor of—other
actors within and external to Latin America.
In general, in comparison to the PRC, Indian engagement with the region appears hampered by a lack
of government diplomatic attention to the region, and
by the absence of coordinated government support to
the efforts of its companies pursuing ventures there.
Either factor could change with a modest adjustment
of government policy, the reform of bureaucracy, or
the infusion of resources. Indeed, India’s Prime Minister Modi promised a new Indian emphasis on foreign
relations; but, he has arguably not yet fully applied
the concept to Latin America.
In petroleum, mining, and agriculture, Indian
companies are often positioned at a higher point on
the value-added chain and are more sophisticated
in managing complex local conditions than are their
Chinese counterparts. However, these companies are
much smaller, and benefit less, than the Chinese from
the demand to supply home markets.
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In manufacturing and retail, Indian companies
often have more experience with the Latin American
markets, supplying products regarded as being of
higher quality and of having better technological content. Yet, Chinese products have leveraged low-cost
access to financial resources and coordinated support
from the Chinese Government to advance more rapidly than their Indian counterparts.
In technology sectors, Indian companies are the
key leaders in select subsectors such as pharma and
technology services, although they are relatively
absent in others, such as telecommunications.
India’s relative absence from the Latin American
finance sector, by comparison to the PRC, is notable,
including the lack of policy for bank lending, branch
banking, and swap agreements. Its similar absence
from the Latin American ports and construction sector
is partly related not only to the lack of developmental
financing, but also to the domestic orientation of Indian construction companies, reinforced by demand
outpacing supply within India itself.
India’s similar absence from the Latin American
military market compared with China’s notwithstanding the unsuccessful experience of HAL’s Dhruv
helicopter in Ecuador, may be partially a product of
greater resource and policy support from the Chinese
Government than its Indian counterpart for overseas
sales from national defense companies.
With the slowing of high commodity prices and
the related deceleration of PRC economic growth,
coupled with China’s increasingly aggressive diplomatic and military actions in Asia, the tide may be
shifting in India’s favor. India’s trade balance with
Latin America has always been more favorable to the
region than that of China, with India not competing
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directly against low-value-added manufacturing the
way Chinese companies do. If the slowing Chinese
economy and non-performing loans at home push
China to pursue Latin American construction projects more aggressively, India’s relative absence from
Latin American construction and finance will become
an advantage in its relationship with the region. Reciprocally, lower commodity prices are reducing the
perceived benefit of China’s substantial imports of petroleum and metals from the region. With respect to
agriculture, the growing Indian population and Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) could cause India to become
a more important export market for Latin American
companies than China. In sectors such as automotive,
technology services, and pharmaceuticals, the disposition of Indian companies to invest in Latin American economies and employ local laborers, combined
with their experience in managing the challenges of
complex democracies, may position them to succeed,
particularly if the Indian Government provides more
coordinated support to its companies pursuing such
ventures.
In the long term, the advances of both India and
China in Latin America and the Caribbean will transform the region in both positive and negative ways,
even as the Caribbean transforms the Chinese and
Indian companies involved, as well as their Latin
American partners. In the process, Indian and Chinese
companies will be, at times, partners—and at times,
competitors—in a complex and changing environment. For policymakers and businesspersons both in
Latin America and the Caribbean and outside the region, negotiating the new environment will require an
understanding of the interplay among multiple actors
and a strategy with sufficient clarity of objectives and
flexibility of implementation.
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